Anticompetitive Effects of the FTC\u27s Attack on Product-Extension Mergers by Ferguson, James M.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 5 Volume 44, Spring 1970, Special 
Edition 
Article 29 
December 2012 
Anticompetitive Effects of the FTC's Attack on Product-Extension 
Mergers 
James M. Ferguson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ferguson, James M. (1970) "Anticompetitive Effects of the FTC's Attack on Product-Extension Mergers," 
St. John's Law Review: Vol. 44 : No. 5 , Article 29. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss5/29 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE FTC'S
ATTACK ON PRODUCT-EXTENSION
MERGERS
JAMES M. FERGUSON*
INTRODUCTION
This paper will consider the important economic issues in the applica-
tion of section 7 of the Clayton Act to conglomerate product-extension
mergers.1 Product-extension mergers are important since they account for
50.4 percent of the acquisitions of manufacturing and mining firms with
assets of $10 million or more over the period 1948-1968; and the annual rate
of acquisitions of manufacturing and mining firms with assets of $10 million
or more has more than doubled in the last five years.2 There were 69 acqui-
sitions in 1963, 101 in 1966, and an estimated 193 in 1968.3
THE FTC's POSITION
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has attacked product-extension
mergers and found them illegal in two leading cases -FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co.,4 and General Foods Corp. v. FTC.5 This paper considers the
most important arguments made by the FTC and excludes the treatment of
the issues by the courts. This limited scope is due to my belief that sensible
enforcement of the anitrust laws depends on correct understanding of the
basic economic issues by the FTC (and by the Justice Department). The
courts cannot be expected to provide the necessary economic analysis, nor to
*Professor of Associate Business, College of Business Administration, The University
of Rochester. A.B., Stanford University, 1958; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1962. Member
of the Center for Research in Government Policy and Business. The author acknowledges
helpful comments from Professors Walter Y. Oi and Michael C. Jensen. This research
was supported in part by a grant from the Relm Foundation.
1 Amended, section 7 states in part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Clayton Act § 7, 15 US.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 25, 1 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
Product-extension mergers involve products which are functionally closely related
and which may permit significant integration in production and distribution activities.
Integration in marketing is especially likely where the products of the firms are sold to
the same customers, or through the same outlets, or are actually complementary.
2 BuREAu OF ECONOMICS, FTC, LARGE MERGERS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING 1948-
1968, at 7 (1969).
3 Id. at 6.
4 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
5 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
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discern economic sense from economic nonsense when there is an over-
whelming quantity of the latter.
The primary economic argument of the FTC in both cases is that
through mergers with much larger firms, Procter and Gamble and General
Foods respectively (hereinafter P&G and G.F.), both Clorox and S.O.S.
allegedly lower their costs due to economies of scale, thereby increasing their
ability to dominate actual and potential rivals. The only alternative for
smaller competitors is to merge with other giant companies or be eliminated.
In addition, the FTC argues that advertising in the household liquid
bleach and household steel-wool soap pad markets is not socially useful for
three reasons. First, advertising in these markets does not benefit consumers
because the products are allegedly identical, and thus the advertising does
not inform the consumer about real alternatives open to him. Second, ex-
tensive advertising creates and maintains strong consumer preferences for
Clorox and S.O.S. which enable them to dominate smaller rivals. A3 a
result, according to the FTC, the bleach and soap pad markets prior to the
mergers were highly concentrated with advertising responsible for an almost
total lack of price competition. Third, the economies of scale achieved by
the mergers are allegedly due primarily to volume discounts in network
television, which do not represent true efficiencies beneficial to consumers
but are discriminatory prices granted to large advertisers. The FTC also
argues that these mergers adversely affect potential competition which al-
legedly had exerted a significant competitive influence on prices in these
markets. Thus, since these mergers increase the ability of the leading firms
to dominate actual and potential rivals, and also are likely to increase the
advertising of Clorox and S.O.S. due to economies of scale in advertising,
they will impair price competition in these markets with no benefits to con-
sumers and should therefore be prevented.
Errors in the FTC's Position
If the FTC's factual assertions concerning the economies of scale re-
sulting from product-extension mergers are correct, these mergers increase
competition in the acquired firms' markets by increasing the number of
firms with lowest attainable costs. Therefore, the FTC's conclusion that
these mergers would harm competition is erroneous. If the FTC's factual
assertions are incorrect - if there are no economies resulting from these
mergers - then the FTC's attack on these mergers is also wrong because the
mergers in no way enhance the ability of the acquired firms to dominate
rivals. Examination of the evidence on economies of scale resulting from
these mergers is necessary only to determine for which reason the FTC is
in error.
Outline of the Paper
Section II analyzes the effects of product-extension mergers on competi-
tion and examines the evidence on economies resulting from these mergers.
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The errors in the FTC's argument are enumerated, assuming its view of the
facts was correct. In addition, errors in the FTC's factual assertions con-
cerning the amount of the cost savings resulting from these two mergers are
considered.
Section III considers the additional argument made in these cases by the
FTC, that advertising and the economies in advertising resulting from these
two product-extension mergers are not socially useful.
Section IV offers a brief summary of the available evidence on the
profitability of conglomerate mergers in our economy. This evidence pro-
vides insights into the size of the economies being realized through conglom-
erate mergers.
An appendix discusses the role of potential competition in these markets
before and after the mergers.
INCREASING COMPETITION THROUGH PRODUCT-EXTENSION MERGERS
A. Errors in the FTC's Argument Assuming There Are Economies of Scale
Which Can Be Achieved Through Mergers
My Basic Argument: The FTC does not and cannot demonstrate anti-
competitive effects due to economies resulting from product-extension merg-
ers. Product-extension mergers permit more firms to exist in each consumer
product market because the economies of large size are derived from sales
in several markets. This argument can be illustrated with the following ex-
ample.
Suppose there are a hundred consumer product industries in the
economy, each with $100 million in sales. Suppose further that there are
constant returns to size in production and distribution but economies of
scale in advertising, until the firm reaches a level of advertising which
produces sales of $100 million. In the absence of product-extension mergers,
there will be only one firm in each industry or a total of one hundred firms
each with sales of $100 million. Thus, each industry will consist of one
monopoly firm. However, if product-extension mergers are permitted, there
can be a hundred firms which are divisions of conglomerates in each in-
dustry, each with $1 million sales. Each conglomerate will operate a firm
in each of the hundred markets and thus have total sales of $100 million.
I cannot see any reason for choosing a market structure with only one firm in
each industry, but this is exactly the choice made by the FTC when it pro-
hibits product-extension mergers. An antitrust policy in which fewer com-
petitors in each market are preferred to more competitors when economies
of large firm size are present is not in the public interest because it promotes
inefficiency in the allocation of resources.
1. The Number of Bleach and Soap Pad Competitors
Suppose the FTC position is correct, i.e., that the development of tele-
vision has increased the economies of large size in national advertising, and
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that maximum efficiency in national advertising can only be achieved by
consumer product firms such as PcG and G.F., which have sales larger than
the entire industry sales of bleach and soap pads respectively. Thus, in the
absence of these product-extension mergers, only one firm could exist in the
bleach and soap pad markets. The only way other than merger for Clorox
and S.O.S. to achieve greater economies of size is to grow larger in their re-
spective markets. If mergers are forbidden, as the FTC advocates, the existing
bleach and soap pad firms will struggle to control the entire market and
thereby realize economies of large size in television advertising. During the
struggle each firm will have higher advertising costs than they would have
through merger. With these alleged economies of size, however, eventually
one firm would grow larger, achieve lower costs, drive out the others, and
attain a monopoly. Product-extension mergers are a more efficient means for
small firms to attain economies of large size because firms like Clorox and
S. 0. S. attain these efficiencies immediately. Without mergers, these firms
incur higher advertising costs throughout the interval in which they struggle
to grow large and increase their market shares. Mergers are also a less costly
means of achieving these economies of scale than having P&G or G.F. enter
by building a new plant and fight for the monopoly position* Entry would
involve additions to industry capacity, and the FTC recognized in both
cases that there was no shortage of productive capacity. And the addition
of unneeded capacity does not benefit consumers.
Given the increase in the economies of large firm size, the only possible
way to ensure the existence of more than one strong competitor in each in-
dustry is to permit product-extension mergers in each industry. Through
these mergers with larger firms in other markets, Clorox and S.O.S. could
gain the economies of large size in advertising without having to increase
their market shares in the bleach and soap pad markets. Therefore, the FTC
reaches exactly the wrong conclusion in attacking these mergers in pursuit
of its policy of maintaining existing competitors in these markets.6 Further-
more, the FTC should welcome the merger of Purex with Brillo, which made
available to both some of the alleged advantages of larger size in national
advertising. The only way to maintain the existing number of firms in a
small firm industry where there is an increase in the economies of large firm
size is to permit every firm in the industry to merge with a firm in another
market.
2. The Number of Mergers
Is there any assurance that other firms in the bleach and soap pad
markets will be acquired by other firms in related consumer product in-
dustries? The FTC apparently believes additional mergers would be very
likely:
6 See General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRAE REG. REP. 17,465
(FTC 1966).
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Furthermore, General Foods' merger had exactly the same consequence
which we noted in our Clorox decision is an important anticompetitive
result of mergers of this type, namely, that of motivating the remaining
firms in the market to seek protection by affiliating by merger with com-
panies larger than themselves .... This was what we predicted would hap-
pen in Clorox and what actually did occur after General Foods' acquisition
when Brillo merged with Purex.
7
These mergers may at least ensure two national competitors in these markets
instead of only one.
Under the conditions specified in the example discussed above, ad-
ditional mergers would be profitable. The critical assumption in the ex-
ample is that the only source of economies of scale was volume discounts in
advertising media which can be earned either by large firms within the
market or by large multi-market firms. If there are economies of scale which
can be achieved only by increasing size within the market, such as economies
of scale in national distribution of the specific product, then established
firms in related consumer markets who acquire a smaller competitor in
these markets will be at a cost disadvantage, at least until national dis-
tribution is achieved. Acquisitions of smaller competitors would thus be
less likely because of a smaller expected profit, unless the acquiring firm felt
it could expand sales into the national market and thus overcome the cost
disadvantage resulting from regional distribution.8
B. Errors in the FTC's Factual Assertions on Economies Achieved by the
Mergers
1. The Evidence on Economies in Advertising
What were the estimated savings in advertising realized by Clorox after
the merger? The question is a difficult one because different figures were
presented by the hearing examiner and the FTC. For some part of the
period July 1, 1957 to June 30, 1958, savings in advertising costs to Clorox
amounted to about $138,500-$86,000 being savings in the costs of spot
television (about 7.5 percent of Clorox's estimated expenditures in spot
television in 1957).9 The total savings were less than 3.5 percent of Clorox's
advertising budget.10 However, the FTC states: "With Clorox now a part of
the Procter line, for the same amount of money Clorox spent on network
television advertising prior to the merger, at least 33Y3 percent more net-
work television advertising can now be obtained."'1
7 Id. at 22,729.
8 In the absence of economies of scale which depend on size within the market, a
newcomer could enter at any scale with no cost disadvantage. Also, the existence of
economies of scale in national distribution creates an incentive to acquire a firm having
such distribution.
9 Procter & Gamble Co., No. 6901, at 44 (FTC Feb. 28, 1962).
10 Id.
11 Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TmDz RE. REP. 16,673, at
21,577 (FTC 1963).
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Someone was a bit careless with the facts in using this argument, because
Clorox was never advertised on network television before the merger.'2
Clorox used only spot television announcements, possibly because it faced
widely varying competitive situations in different geographic areas. Spot
television ads allow a firm to adapt its advertising to its marketing needs
more efficiently than network advertising, which puts the same amount of
advertising into all markets.
Table I below contains the estimated advertising expenditures of Clorox
over the period 1955-1963. The figures reveal that Clorox was never adver-
tised on network television before the merger and has not been advertised on
network television since the merger. In addition, it appears that Clorox did
not begin to use spot television until 1966.
TABLE I
ESTIMATED ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES OF CLoRox BLEAcH IN MEAsuRED MEDIA
1955-1963
General Farm Network Spot
Magazines Magazines Outdoor TV Newspapers TV
1955 $490,596 $63,500 - - $2,388,017 -
1956 501,695 69,125 $24,720 - 1,966,333 $ 675,660
1957 342,256 46,240 78,005 - 1,537,376 1,930,720
1958 354,800 - - - 1,276,363 2,696,020
1959 379,000 - - - 1,634,000 3,027,000
1960 521,000 - - - 1,446,000 2,500,000
1961 446,000 - - - 1,352,000 3,340,000
1962 503,970 - - - 976,866 3,852,160
1963 844,538 - - - 415,234 5,794,320
SouRcEs: AMERICAN NEwSPAPER PUBLISHERS AssocIATION, ExPENDITuREs OF NATIONAL
ADVERTISERS IN NEWSPAPERS 1955-1963; LEADING NATIONAL ADVERTISERS, NATIONAL ADVERTIS-
ING INVESTMENTS 1955-1963; TELEVISION BUREAU OF ADVERTISING, SPOT TELEVISION ADVt-
TUSING ExPENDITuRS 1956-1963.
If this is correct, then Clorox gained its dominant position in the household
liquid bleach market without the use of televisionl
What were the estimated savings in advertising costs to S.O.S. following
the merger with G.F.? The hearing examiner's opinion mentions that several
years after the merger, S.O.S. was advertised on some of G.F.'s nighttime
television shows -advertising which S.O.S. could not purchase before the
merger. No estimate is given of any cost savings.1 Despite this, the FTC
found savings in advertising costs to S.O.S. (by combination of its adver-
tising with General Foods) of 23 percent in network television, 15 percent
in spot television, 5.5 percent in radio, and 5.15 percent in magazines. 14
12 Network sales are sales to national advertisers of the time of groups of individual
stations affiliated with the networks. National spot sales are sales of station time directly to
advertisers by individual stations.
18 General Foods Corp., No. 8600 (FTC Dec. 18, 1964).
14 General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465, at
22,727 (FTC 1966).
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The numbers are highly inaccurate. (The 23 percent in network television
is even larger than the 17 percent mentioned in the counsel's brief before
the FTC.)'5 On the basis of Peterman's analysis of the discounts in net-
work television, it is unlikely that the savings in time-costs exceeded 5
percent.' 6
2. Alleged Superior Efficiency of Network Television
The FTC argued in both cases that commercials during network pro-
grams, especially nighttime programs, are more effective than spot breaks,
and that Clorox and S.O.S. could not afford to sponsor nighttime TV
shows. Again no evidence was presented to demonstrate that the return per
dollar of advertising was greater; such evidence is necessary since the net-
work and spot rates differ. Presumably, the higher network rates reflect any
advantage which exists. In both cases the FTC also argued that after the
merger Clorox and S.O.S. could advertise jointly with the acquiring firm
on a number of evening network shows - which they could not afford prior
to the mergers -at a fraction of the cost of sponsoring the entire shows.
Again, the FTC argument is weak since the growth of participation pur-
chases made access to these shows possible even in the absence of the
mergers.17 Further, neither argument applies to Clorox since it did not ad-
vertise on network television.
3. Other Alleged Economies in Marketing
The FTC argues in both cases that the wealth of the large firm can be
used to finance sales promotion expenditures by Clorox and S.O.S. Both
acquired firms allegedly did not engage in sales promotion activities prior
to the mergers and both initiated them afterwards. However, Clorox spent
less than $500,000 per year, while S.O.S. spent approximately $200,000 in
1963 on consumer sales promotions (primarily price reducing coupons and
cents-off-labels).' 5 Neither firm lacked the financial resources necessary for
15 Brief for Respondent at 43, General Foods Corp., No. 8600 (FTC, Dec. 18, 1964).
16 Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 11 J. LAw & EcoN.
321, 344-45 (1968).
17 The trend in network television purchasing patterns has been toward more partici-
pation purchases and less full program sponsorship. Instead of spending their advertising
funds on the sponsorship of one or two programs, advertisers now typically buy parts of
several shows in the form of participations. Multiple or participating sponsorship of prime
time programs increased from a little more than 10 percent of prime time program hours
in 1957 to almost 80 percent in 1964. The growth in participation purchases may be ex-
plained as a means of spreading an advertiser's budget among a wider range of shows,
permitting him to reach a greater unduplicated audience, as well as the different groups
who are most interested in his different products. Note also that the growth in participa-
tion purchases makes it possible for smaller advertisers to buy commercial minutes during
prime time, although it might not be feasible for them to sponsor a complete show during
prime time. In effect, an advertiser can buy fractional amounts of a program. The growth
in participation purchases has thus increased the opportunities available to smaller
advertisers in network television.
IS Data on sales promotion expenditures of Clorox is found in Procter & Gamble Co.,
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such expenditures prior to the merger. Apparently, the merger gave the ac-
quired firms access to the expertise of marketing men in the acquiring firms
who conducted (or at least advised on) the sales promotions. It is also possible,
since both acquiring firms devoted millions of dollars to sales promotion
activities, that economies of size in these activities were made available to
the acquired firms.
In both cases it is asserted that economies in distribution could result
from use of the acquiring firm's sales force rather than the independent
brokers used by both Clorox and S.O.S. prior to the merger.19 S.O.S. also
benefitted from economies in warehousing costs. 20 Little can be said about
these other alleged economies resulting from the merger, except that they do
not appear large.21
C. Conclusions
Although the FTC overestimated the reductions in advertising costs to
Clorox and S.O.S. which resulted from the mergers, apparently some econo-
mies were achieved. Therefore, the arguments outlined in Part A concerning
errors in the FTC's position apply to these cases.
ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER WELFARE
A. Introduction
1. The FTC's Position
The FTC admits that advertising stimulates competition insofar as it
informs the consumer about alternative products. It also recognizes that it
increases the sales of the advertised products and, with economies of scale,
may reduce the unit cost and price of the product. However, it contends that
this process does not occur in industries such as bleach and soap pads, where,
since the products are identical, there is no reason other than price and
availability for the consumer to prefer one brand over another. Therefore,
heavy advertising does not increase the real alternatives open to the con-
sumer; its sole justification is to create and protect the dominant positions
No. 6901, at 31, table 2 (FTC, Feb. 28, 1962); for S.O.S. in General Foods Corp., [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465, at 22,741 (FTC 1966).
19 There is no evidence that the independent brokers were less efficient than the P & G
sales staff. Clorox continued to use the same brokers after the merger. [1963-1965 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,577-78 (FTC 1963). For S.O.S. see [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465, at 22,740 (FTC 1966).
20General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465, at
22,740 (FTC 1966).
21 A final alleged source of competitive advantage to Clorox and S.O.S. is the large
sales shares which P&G and G.F. have of other consumer products which are distributed
through grocery stores. Because of the sizable sales of these other products, Clorox and
S.O.S. may be in better bargaining positions to obtain shelf space from grocers as a result
of the mergers. Again, this argument is lacking in both theoretical and empirical content.
If P&G and G.F. could induce retailers to give their products favored treatment and better
display positions, they would already have done so. In addition, no evidence was intro-
duced by the FTC to support this argument.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of Clorox and S.O.S. Moreover, since the firms in such industries do not
engage in price competition, prices do not fall. Indeed, the prices of Clorox
and S.O.S. are higher than all other brands. Therefore consumers are com-
pelled to pay higher prices, yet receive no benefits. In such industries "cost
advantages that enable still more intensive advertising only impair price
competition further; they do not benefit the consumer.
22
2. The FTC's Error
The basic fallacy in the FTC's argument is the assertion that the dif-
ferent brands are identical. I agree that advertising results in higher prices
for Clorox bleach and S.O.S. soap pads, but it also must yield benefits to
consumers or they would be unwilling to pay the higher price. It will be
rational for producers to advertise only if customers desire the advertising
and are willing to pay the higher product price to cover its cost. In both of
these markets, consumers had the choice of buying lower price, less adver-
tised brands, yet they overwhelmingly preferred to buy Clorox and S.O.S.
3. The Remaining Issues
Two additional components of the FTC's attack on advertising will be
examined in detail. Part B considers whether advertising created concen-
trated, non-competitive bleach and soap pad market structures prior to the
mergers, and if so, how this was accomplished. Part C examines the ad-
ditional argument made by the FTC that the main economies resulting from
these mergers are due to discriminatory volume discounts granted to large
advertisers in network television.
B. Advertising and Market Structure
1. Introduction and Summary
a. The FTC's Explanation of High Concentration and Lack of Entry.23
In each case the FTC presents three arguments in support of its position
22 Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE RaE. REP. 16,675, at
21,586 (FTC 1963).
23 In 1957 Clorox had 48.8 percent of national liquid bleach sales, and its market
share had been steadily increasing for at least the previous five years. Purex, the nearest
rival, had 15.7 percent, and the six largest firms accounted for 80 percent of the market.
The remainder was divided among approximately 200 small regional and local producers.
Small-scale entry into regional markets was possible and occurred in the post-war period.
No patents existed, the information on production procedures was readily available, no
shortages of equipment or raw materials existed, the equipment was inexpensive, and
relatively small-scale production could be efficient. Transport costs were significant, making
it unprofitable to ship bleach more than 300 miles from a plant. In 1957 Clorox had sales
of about $40 million and spent about $3.7 million on advertising. Purex, which also sold
products in the cleanser, soap, and detergent markets, had total sales of about $50 million
and spent about $3.6 million on advertising. Total industry sales in 1957 were less than
$100 million. Sales of household liquid bleach expanded steadily in the post-war period.
In 1957 the steel wool soap pad market was highly concentrated. S.O.S. had 51 per-
cent of the market and its only sizable rival, Brillo, had 47.6 percent. The market share
of S.O.S. had declined slightly in the two previous years. Three small producers accounted
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that advertising created a noncompetitive market structure prior to the
mergers. The main argument is that extensive advertising over a period of
time has built up consumer preferences for the Clorox and S.O.S. brands,
and that smaller competitors cannot obtain the funds necessary to advertise
on a scale sufficient to overcome these existing preferences. And for the same
reason - inability to raise sufficient funds to advertise effectively - entry
cannot occur. Finally, the Commission argues that Clorox and S.O.S. con-
tinue to advertise heavily in order to increase the capital required for entry
and to thereby further reduce the threat of entry.
b. Shortcomings in the FTC's Explanation. Examination of the argu-
ments and the evidence demonstrates that all three arguments are erroneous.
The conditions postulated by the FTC for the existence of strong brand
loyalty do not exist in these markets. Further, the evidence presented in-
dicates that strong brand loyalty does not exist in the bleach market. (No
evidence was presented concerning brand loyalty in the soap pad market.)
Similarly, there is no evidence of lack of capital on the part of the many
possible entrants which are established firms in other consumer product
markets. In addition, the capital needed to produce and sell in the bleach
and soap pad markets is much smaller than in many other consumer product
markets. The argument concerning advertising by Clorox and S.O.S. to
prevent entry overlooks the more obvious explanation that the advertising
stimulated industry demand. Since bleach and soap pad sales grew at a
steady rate throughout the period covered in these cases, I argue that the
advertising increased industry demand and was therefore profitable.
c. An Alternative Explanation of High Concentration and Lack of
Entry. The success of Clorox and S.O.S. and the resultant high concentration
are due to their success in securing national distribution. With national
distribution Clorox and S.O.S. realize economies of scale in information.24
That is, unlike brands distributed in only one region, nationally known
and distributed brands are not as likely to lose the loyalty of consumers
who move from one region to another. This competitive advantage increased
in the post-World War II period with the increase in the movement of con-
sumers among regions. Additionally, firms having national distribution can
utilize national advertising media, which may be more efficient than local
or regional media. 25
for the remaining 1.4 percent. Two of the three small firms had entered in the period
1952-1956. Thus, small-scale entry into regional markets was obviously possible and
actually occurred. No patents existed after the 1930's, no shortages of equipment or raw
materials existed, the equipment was specialized but could be obtained for about $200,000
to $300,000, and again, apparently relatively small-scale production could be efficient. In
1957 S.O.S. had sales of about $14.6 million and spent about $2.1 million on advertising.
Brillo had sales of $13.6 million and spent about $1.8 million on advertising. Both had
nationwide distribution. Total industry sales in 1957 were less than $29 million. Sales of
steel-wool soap pads expanded steadily in the postwar period.
24This factor is mentioned in both cases.
25 The FTC mentions this factor in the Clorox case but does not discuss it. Because
television is so important in the advertising of consumer products, the pertinent question
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Entry may not have occurred because economies of national distribution
and advertising made entry feasible only on a large scale relative to the
size of these markets. Such new entry would have substantially increased
industry output and lowered industry price - conditions increasing the risk
of unsuccessful entry. Also, the longer term profit prospects may not have
been attractive due to the rising costs of obtaining retail shelf space and
the likelihood of the introduction of superior substitute products.
2. Detailed Analysis of the Causes of High Concentration and Lack of Entry
a. Brand Loyalty. The FTC bases its economic argument concerning
brand loyalty on the work of Professor Bain,26 who argues that there are
certain characteristics of products which determine the effectiveness of
product differentiation in building consumer allegiance. According to Bain,
the opportunities for product differentiation are especially good for "pres-
tige" or "gift" goods, where price tends to be relatively less important to
consumers than product reputation, and for products which are complex or
have other characteristics which make consumers unable to evaluate them,
even after repeated use.27 Bain admits that his list of conditions favorable
to product differentiation is not exhaustive because there are some industries
which possess none of the above cited characteristics, and yet have extensive
product differentiation. 28 Soap pads and bleach would appear to be good
examples; both are basic household necessities purchased frequently and at
relatively low unit prices. In fact, these products have characteristics which
Bain asserts are not conducive to product differentiation.
Conversely, the best basic settings for slight product differentiation ...
are found for goods which are purchased for their basic or functional
utility, which the consumer can easily evaluate and appraise, and which,
being nondurable, are purchased frequently and in small amounts, allow-
ing the consumer a maximum opportunity for experimentation with the
comparison of alternatives.2 9
is whether network television is a more efficient advertising medium than spot television.
I doubt there are significant differences in efficiency. Network sales are sales to national
advertisers of the time of groups of individual stations affiliated with a network. National
spot sales are sales of station time directly to advertisers by individual stations. Thus spot
television is a close substitute for network television, and the two sets of advertising rates
will reflect these competitive interrelationships.
In addition, an important feature of the spot market is that many, if not all, televi-
sion stations have regional and local spot rate cards in addition to the national spot rate
card. Regional and local advertisers can buy time in the spot market at rates of 20 to
30 percent lower than the rates charged the national advertisers. Smaller regional enter-
prises which compete with large national concerns can thus obtain much lower rates. Also,
retailers can advertise private brands which compete with national brands at much lower
rates. The following unpublished sources contain data on regional and local television
rates: Gardner Advertising Company, Local Television Rate Survey (mimeographed 1966);
Gardner Advertising Company, Study of Advertising Rates in the Television Industry
(mimeographed 1961).
26 J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959).
27Id. at 417-18.
28 Id. at 418.
29d. at 417-18.
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According to Bain's analysis, brand advertising would not be expected to be
very successful in developing consumer loyalty for bleach and soap pads and,
therefore, would not be expected to give large firms dominance over smaller
firms or to impede the entry of newcomers.
In addition, the FTC presents evidence in the Clorox case which
demonstrates that brand loyalty was not strong in the bleach industry.
The allegiance to a particular brand that is created by mass ad-
vertising and promotion tends, in the case of low-cost, high-turnover house-
hold products, to be somewhat ephemeral; the housewife is easily lured
from her accustomed brand by promotional and advertising efforts on the
part of rival manufacturers. The record in this case contains a graphic
illustration of the volatile quality of consumer brand preference. 0
The FTC then cited what happened in Erie, Pennsylvania, when Purex
attacked Clorox's entrenched position.8 1 (Clorox controlled more than 50
percent of the market.) Purex was sold in a new container and price-off labels
were used intensively. "Within a few weeks, Purex, which previously had
done no business in the area, had won a market share of more than 30 per-
cent."3 2 Clorox, counterattacking with price-off and premium offers and
intensive advertising, subsequently reduced Purex's share to 7 percent.33
The FTC, in applying the Bain analysis, fails to recognize that the
liquid bleach and the steel-wool soap pads markets do not possess the char-
acteristics necessary for the development of strong brand loyalty, and refuses
to accept the evidence which demonstrates the lack of brand loyalty.
b. Capital Barriers to Competition. The FTC asserts that small firms
and potential competitors in the bleach and soap pad markets lacked access
to the funds necessary to secure national distribution and to undertake large-
scale national advertising. Yet, although none of the smaller regional and
local competitors in either market achieved national distribution during the
1950's, there is no evidence that lack of access to funds was responsible.
This argument is even less convincing in view of the fact that both
Clorox and S.O.S. started as small enterprises around 1920, and grew to
leading positions in their respective markets apparently by means of superior
skill and efficiency. Apparently both firms spent less than $1 million per
year on advertising prior to the 1950's, and yet these small firms were suc-
cessful.
In addition, this lack of capital argument is weak, because there are
many established firms in other markets which could raise sufficient capital
to enter and compete in these markets. The argument that large capital costs
inhibit entry fails to distinguish between entry by new and small firms and
entry by established and large diversifying enterprises. The latter will not
tend to encounter any alleged imperfections in the capital market, and will
30 Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673,
at 21,565 (FTC 1963).
31Id.
321d. at 21,564.
38 Id.
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not be prevented from entering if entry appears profitable. Additionally,
the established firm may be able to adapt its existing dealer organization to
the marketing of new products or to overcome brand preferences by using
a well established brand name to give prestige to a new product - in both
cases significantly reducing the capital costs required for entry.
c. Lack of Entry. One outstanding fact appears to support the position
of the FTC that significant barriers to entry exist in these markets - namely,
that no sizable new national competitor entered either market over more
than a 10-year period, despite strong growth in industry demand and ap-
parently attractive rates of return. The only sizable potential entrant men-
tioned in either case, P&G, considered entry into the bleach market as a
new competitor to Clorox and Purex and decided against it.34
Why didn't P&G enter? One possible explanation is that P&G, despite
its vast resources, skilled marketing personnel, and economies of scale in
advertising, did not believe it could secure a sufficient share of the bleach
market to make a profit. Clorox and Purex, while having much smaller
resources, perhaps had superior specialized skills and knowledge in this
market. On the basis of the available evidence, I do not believe that Clorox
had any cost advantage over P&G because of their specialized skills or
knowledge. But then, there are no barriers to entry, since barriers are de-
fined to be cost advantages of established firms over potential entrants. Can
the lack of entry be explained in the absence of barriers?
A possible explanation for the lack of entry in the absence of barriers
is that entry into the bleach and soap pad markets was unattractive due to
the economies of scale in those industries. Economies of scale refer to the
relationship between firm size and costs of production, distribution, and
marketing. The greater the economies of scale, the greater the range over
which the average costs of larger outputs will fall. The minimum optimum
size of firm refers to the smallest output at which the economies of scale
are exhausted. If a firm operated at a smaller scale, it would not be utilizing
all of the available economies of size, and would thus have higher costs than
larger firms. If, in order to achieve the lowest average cost, a firm must
produce an output at least equal to 50 percent of the market, then there
can be, at most, two firms in the industry in long-run equilibrium.8 5
Will the existence of economies of scale in such an industry place a
potential entrant at any cost disadvantage?8 6 Yes, but only if the newcomer
84 Id. at 21,563.
85 There can be at most two firms in the industry if the economies of scale are internal
to the industry. There can be more than two firms if the economies of scale can be achieved
through product-extension mergers with firms in other markets.
86 The argument applies only to economies which are internal to the industry. I
argued above that Clorox and S.OS. achieved their large market shares as a result of
economies of scale in national distribution and in national advertising. It is efficient to
use national advertising media only if the firm has national distribution. National distribu-
tion makes it possible to retain customers who move from one region to another. Therefore,
P&G and G.F., if they entered by setting up new firms, would have to enter at a national
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has a firm of less than optimum size. Economies of scale do not give estab-
lished firms any competitive advantage over newcomers who enter at
minimum optimum size and, therefore, do not constitute a barrier to entry.
However, the newcomer will have to attract numerous customers away from
existing firms in order to sell his substantial output. In addition, his sizable
output increases the industry output, and can significantly lower the in-
dustry price. If the pre-entry industry price is close to or equal to minimum
average cost, then the new price can be below minimum cost and losses will
be incurred by some or all firms - including the entrant - until industry
output is reduced to the previous level. Thus, the risk of unsuccessful entry
in such markets tends to be much greater than in markets in which the
optimum size of firm is small relative to the size of market. Entry will be
easier in situations where the minimum efficient market share of a new-
comer is small, since his entry will then have a small impact on existing
firms and industry price.
It would be reasonable for the management of P & G, perceiving these
problems, to rationally decide not to enter via internal growth. Large, estab-
lished, national advertisers, who could enter and successfully compete due
to greater economies in national advertising than those attained by Clorox
and S. 0. S., would still prefer to enter other consumer product markets in
which efficient size could be attained without the prospect of sharing or
incurring losses due to excess capacity.
Both the bleach and soap pad markets enjoyed steady growth in in-
dustry demand, which might have increased the number of optimum size
firms which could exist in each market. However, the failure of new entry
in the face of sizable growth in industry demand can possibly be explained
by a growth in the minimum efficient size of firm in these markets. Clorox
and S. 0. S. both apparently steadily increased their market shares over time,
with the growth in industry demand. If the minimum efficient size of firm
increased at a faster rate than the rate of growth in industry demand, then
concentration would increase and entry would tend to be unprofitable.
However, since prices in both markets were above minimum average
cost, additional output would not necessarily result in losses. Another pos-
sible explanation of the lack of entry is that future prospects for the bleach
and soap pad industries appeared lufficiently poor to make entry via internal
growth much less profitable than entry via merger. A basic difference be-
tween the two forms of entry is the length of time involved. P & G and G. F.
might reasonably have predicted a reasonable rate of return on merger in-
vestment over a short period of time, possibly due to economies in marketing
and distribution which they could achieve. The short-term expected rate of
scale or suffer a cost disadvantage compared to Clorox and S.O.S. Even if P&G and G.F.
could advertise on network television at lower rates, it would not be beneficial for them
to do so until they had achieved national distribution of their brands of bleach and
soap pads. In the absence of economies of scale which depend on size within the mar-
ket, a newcomer could enter at any scale with no cost disadvantage.
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industry profit apparently was attractive because both P & G and G. F. paid
sizable premiums to enter the market via the merger route.3 7 If short-run
profit prospects were not attractive, these acquisitions would not have been
rational. The longer-term outlook might have been less attractive due to
expected growth in technical substitutes for liquid bleach and for steel wool
soap pads. The development of detergents with enzymes has probably en-
croached to some degree on liquid bleach sales. Furthermore, the develop-
ment of plastic and other non-steel-wool scouring devices has probably
tended to limit the expansion of steel-wool soap pad sales, especially with
the growth in consumer use of teflon-coated pans, which cannot be cleaned
with steel wool without damaging the coating.
Another possible factor clouding the future profit prospects is the
growing limitations on access to retail shelf space. There is some evidence
that the number of products competing for shelf space has expanded much
more rapidly than the growth in number and size of stores.38 If there has
been a relative growth in items which yield higher returns to retail grocers,
then the amount of shelf space devoted to bleach and soap pads will tend to
decline. These circumstances would make entry more costly and, therefore,
less attractive. I have been unable to collect the evidence to test this hypoth-
esis.
d. Lack of Expansion into the National Market by Smaller Com-
petitors. Economies of scale in a market are also important to existing small
firms. Small firms operating in these markets have higher costs than firms
of optimum size, and thus have an incentive to expand. However, the size
of the market will limit the number of firms of optimum size which can
profitably operate in the industry. For example, if a firm must produce an
output equal to at least 50 percent of the market in order to achieve lowest
average cost, then there can be, at most, two firms in the industry in long-
run equilibrium. Thus, while small firms would like to expand, if they
recognize that the number of efficient national firms which can survive may
be only two, they might rationally decide not to expand into the national
market. The failure to expand by regional competitors does not necessarily
spell doom for them if there are regional markets which can efficiently be
served by smaller, local firms because of the high transportation costs. These
circumstances appear to exist in the bleath market, and possibly also in the
soap pad market. Under these circumstances, the presence of large national
firms and small regional firms may be expected to continue. Also, they may
not have expanded because of lack of superior management, which made the
expected return on the additional investment appear unattractive, or be-
cause their management simply preferred to limit operations to one area.
37 See General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465
at 22,738 (FTC 1966); Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,673, at 21,565 (FTC 1963).
38 "There is an acute shortage of shelf space for all products . . . in the nations'
grocery stores because of the greatly increased number and types of items carried by
grocers in recent years." No. 6901, at 24 (FTC, Feb. 28, 1962).
PRODUCT-EX TENSION MERGERS
3. The Cause of Heavy Advertising in These Markets
The reason for the heavy advertising of liquid bleach and steel-wool
soap pads remains to be considered. The FTC argues that the heavy adver-
tising of identical products in oligopolistic markets does not increase in-
dustry sales, but does protect the market shares of the dominant firms.39 The
Commission does not recognize the competition for consumer expenditures
between these products and other products. To assert that the advertising
did nothing to stimulate industry sales of bleach and soap pads is, I believe,
unwarranted. Both industry sales and advertising rose steadily over the
period. An alternative explanation can be offered which is consistent with
this evidence and which recognizes that the competitive effects of advertising
differ from the effects of a price reduction, because the firms can compete
for new customers without earning lower returns on sales to previous
customers.
Telser provides a model which incorporates this difference in com-
petitive effects and which appears to fit the liquid bleach and soap pad
markets.
Commodities of certain characteristics and produced under oligopolistic
conditions are likely to be heavily advertised. First, there must be few firms
in the industry and cross-elasticities must be high. The latter implies that
if one firm reduces its price and the others do not follow, it can increase
its sales by a large amount at their expense. Second, the price elasticity for
the product must be low. Third, there must exist a large potential market
that can be realized by means of advertising. 40
The liquid bleach and steel-wool soap pad markets contain only two sizable
producers. Prices of the two competing brands are almost identical, suggest-
ing high cross elasticities of demand.41 In such cases, a price decrease by one
firm will increase sales primarily at the expense of rivals. But if the price
elasticity of demand for the product as a whole is low, which is likely, then
a price reduction will increase industry sales very little.42 On the other hand,
competition by advertising can expand the total market if new customers
can be convinced to try the product.
Significant growth in industry sales accompanied the advertising of
Clorox and S.O.S. Sales of household liquid bleach in the 1956-1958 period
exceeded those in the 1953-1955 period by 27.62 percent, 43 and sales in the
1959-1961 period exceeded those in the 1956-1958 period by 20.57 percent.44
39 Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE R c. RE. 16,673,
at 21,586 (FTC 1963).
40 Telser, How Much Does It Pay Whom to Advertise?, 50 AM. EcoN. Rzv. 194, 201
(1961).
41 The cross elasticity of demand is the percentage increase in quantity demanded of
one brand in response to a given percentage increase in the price of the other.
42 The elasticity of demand is the percentage change in quantity divided by the per-
centage change in price. The less sensitive demand is to price, the smaller will be the
increase in quantity demanded in response to a given percentage decrease in price.
43 Brief for Petitioner at 75, 77, Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir.
1966).
44 Id.
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"Sales of S.O.S. soap pads increased from $3.9 million in 1948 to $14.6 mil-
lion in 1957." 45 Total manufacturers' household steel wool sales increased
from slightly over $24 million in 1955 to over $34 million in 1962.46
4. Conclusions
The FTC explains the high concentration and lack of entry primarily
in terms of extensive advertising of identical products by established firms,
and limited access to funds by actual and potential competitors. The FTC
asserts that heavy advertising of identical products produces no benefits to
consumers. I argue that the high concentration and the lack of entry may
be due to economies of large size in national distribution and in national
advertising which suggest efficiencies beneficial to consumers. Economies of
large firm size make necessary large scale entry, which would substantially
increase industry output and, possibly, significantly lower industry price.
Both factors increase the risk of unsuccessful entry. Lack of entry on a
national scale may also be due to a poor longer-term industry-profit outlook.
The FTC argues that continued advertising serves only to prevent entry,
while I explain the continued advertising of Clorox and S.O.S. as a means
of increasing industry demand - which again suggests that advertising bene-
fits consumers by informing them of alternative products.
C. Economies in Network Television Advertising
1. The FTC's Position and Its Shortcomings
a. The Issue. The FTC asserts that volume discounts for time pur-
chases in network television represent discriminatory prices granted to larger
advertisers. I argue that no discrimination exists. The reason is that each ad-
vertiser purchases time and talent in order to reach potential customers, and
the number of television viewers varies over the day, week, and year. The
discounts for time purchases are simply price adjustments for these vari-
ations in audience size. Therefore, the relevant issue is whether the network
rate structures provide large advertisers with lower cost-per-thousand tele-
vision-homes reached, than small advertisers. The cost-per-thousand evidence
discussed below shows that large advertisers do not have lower costs-per-
thousand than small advertisers.
b. Shortcomings in the FTC's Rate Analysis. The FTC presents no
concentration data or other evidence of network market structure to demon-
strate that large advertisers have the power to extract price concessions from
the networks. The share of total network television advertising accounted for
by the largest eight advertisers in 1956, 1960, and 1964 was 32.5 percent, 29.9
percent, and 27.7 percent respectively. 47 These are relatively small con-
45 General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465,
at 22,732 (FTC 1966).
46 Id. at 22,743, Table I.
4 7 See generally AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, EXPENDITURES OF NA-
TIONAL ADVERTISERS IN NEWSPAPERS (1956, 1960 and 1964); LEADING NATIONAL ADVERTISERS,
ING, SPOT TELEVISION ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES (1956, 1960 and 1964).
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centration ratios, and also show a decline in the leading advertisers' share
over timel These data indicate that the largest advertisers are not in a
position to compel networks to grant them special discounts, and that the
relative market position of the largest advertisers has declined over time,
thus further reducing any prospect that they might achieve such a position.
Furthermore, a basic fact overlooked by the FTC undermines its charge
that network television rate structures discriminate against small advertisers,
namely that for all practical purposes no small advertisers use network
television. In fact, very few national advertisers use this medium. In 1956
there were 320 network television advertisers, 240 of whom spent more than
$100,000 and 96 of whom spent $1 million or more on time purchases only;
in 1966 there were 361 advertisers; 326 spent more than $100,000 and 180
spent more than $1 million on purchases of time and program. 48 These
findings seem reasonable since smaller firms without nationwide distribution
do not find it profitable to use network television because much of the
audience would be located in areas where they do not have distribution.
However, to complete the critique of the FTC's position, an analysis
will be made of the prices paid by large and small network television ad-
vertisers. The most disturbing element of the FTC's analysis of television
advertising rates is that the FTC never considered why the television net-
works offered volume discounts, nor the definition of the relevant product
or service provided by television. 49 No explanation based on underlying
economic factors was even mentioned. In fact, the distinctions between net-
work and spot television markets and between the pricing of time and
programs were not clearly perceived.50 These glaring deficiencies have not
gone unnoticed by economists writing about these cases. 51
45 These figures were derived from the following sources: LEADING NATIONAL AD-
VERTISERS, NATIONAL AUVERTISING INVESTMENTS (1956 and 1966). The data on network televi-
sion expenditures in these reports cover only estimated time purchases in 1956, but include
estimated time and program purchases in 1966. It is possible that the number of advertisers
spending less than $20,000 in network television is under-reported in this source.
49 The FTC also failed to recognize that because the discounts were at least a function
of the time of day and the season of the year, the relationship between the quantity
purchased and the discount earned is very complex and cannot be directly compared to a
market in which discounts depend only on the volume purchased.
50 Conventional network sales are sales to national advertisers of the time of groups
of individual stations affiliated with a network. National spot sales are sales of station
time directly to advertisers by individual stations. With conventional network sponsorship
the advertiser purchases units of time, such as 8 P.M. to 9 P.M. once weekly, usually in
multiples of 13 weeks, on a specified number of network affiliated stations. This con-
tract for time is subject to the discounts given on the network rate card. However, the
advertiser must present a program and the program costs, which often account for 50
percent of total costs for programs shown between 7:30 P.M. and 11:00 P.M., are not
subject to discount and the rates for programs do not appear on the network rate cards.
Programs can be purchased from various program producers as well as the networks.
Networks also offer participation programs, in which several advertisers jointly sponsor a
program with each advertiser paying a single price to cover his portion of the time and
program costs. The time discounts also do not apply to participation purchases. For a
detailed discussion of these rate structures see Peterman, The Structure of National Time
Rates in the Television Broadcasting Industry, 8 J. LAw & EcoN. 77 (1965).
51 See, e.g., Blank, Tonypandy Once Again, 42 J. Bus. U. CHI. 104 (1969); Blank, Tele-
vision Advertising: The Great Discount Illusion, or Tonypandy Revisited, 41 J. Bus. U.
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2. An Alternative Economic Analysis of the Network Rate Structures
a. The Basic Pricing Problem. The end-product of television, or any
other advertising medium, from the point of view of the advertiser is the
audience; the advertiser incurs time and talent costs for the opportunity
to reach potential customers. One noteworthy aspect of the sale of these op-
portunities to advertisers by the television networks is that the amount of
the end-product - the audience - cannot be determined as accurately as in
many businesses. Obviously, the amount spent on talent for a show can in-
fluence audience size. The greater the amount spent on the talent used in a
program, the larger the audience viewing the program will tend to be. But
even if the quality of all programs were the same, the size of the audience
would tend to vary over the viewing day. More people watch television in
the evenings than in the daytime, and due to factors external to the tele-
vision industry - the work and vacation habits of the public - the average
audience size tends to be larger in the winter than in the summer. The
fundamental pricing problem facing the three television networks and the
individual television stations is to set prices which take into account the
variations in the quantity of the television audience over the viewing day,
week, and year. The main features of the television rate structure can be
understood in terms of this basic pricing problem.
b. The Evidence on Cost-Per-Thousand. The relevant question is
whether the network television advertising rate structures provide large
advertisers with lower costs-per-thousand television-homes reached than
small advertisers. To answer this question, the average cost-per-thousand
television-homes reached in December 1965, was computed for a sample of
network television advertisers. A sample of 71 advertisers was selected by
taking the largest advertiser, the fifth largest advertiser, and every fifth ad-
vertiser thereafter in descending order of total network expenditures in 1965.
However, 31 did no network television advertising in December 1965, leav-
ing 40 advertisers to be included in the statistical analysis. Of these 40 ad-
vertisers, 29 advertised on nighttime network television in December, 24 on
daytime network television, and 13 on both. The advertisers, their total
network television expenditures in 1965, and their average cost-per-thousand
household reached are presented in Table II below. These expenditure data
include estimated net time and talent costs. Inspection of these figures reveals
that the cost-per-thousand numbers are much lower for daytime television
than for evening television. 52 Therefore, daytime and evening cost data were
treated separately.
CH. 10 (1968); Leonard, Network Television Pricing: A Comment, 12 J. Bus. U. Cm. 93
(1969); Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 11 J. LAw & EcoN.
321 (1968).
52 The average cost-per-thousand television-homes reached per commercial minute in
the daytime is little more than one-third the cost-per-thousand television-homes reached
in the evening on network television. These systematic differences in cost-per-thousand
figures are probably due primarily to the absence of many members of the household
during the viewing day. Thus the quality of the audience from the point of view of
advertisers is much less during the daytime.
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TABLE II
COST-PER-THOUSAND TELEVISION-HomsS REACHED IN DECEMBER 1965 VIA
NETWORK TELEVISION FOR A SAMPLE OF NATIONAL ADVERTISERS
Advertiser
Procter and Gamble Company
Colgate-Palmolive Company
General Motors Corporation
Ford Motor Company
Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company
P. Lorillard Company
Ralston Purina Company
Pillsbury Company
General Electric Company
American Cyanamid Company
American Telephone and Telegraph Compai
Polaroid Corporation
Shulton, Incorporated
Borden Company
Maybelline Company
Sears Roebuck and Company
Gulf Oil Corporation
Socony Mobil Oil Company, Incorporated
Ocean Spray Cranberries, Incorporated
Motorola, Incorporated
Wilkinson Sword, Incorporated
Sperry and Hutchinson Company
Hoffman-La Roche, Incorporated
Schering Corporation
Mead Johnson and Company
Associated Products, Incorporated
Marx Louis and Company, Incorporated
American Doll and Toy Corporation
Wrather Corporation
Remco Industries, Incorporated
Lanvin-Charles of the Ritz, Incorporated
General Telephone and Electronics Corporati
Duffy-Mott Company, Incorporated
Buxton, Incorporated
Mogen David Wine Corporation
Sanford Ink Company
Masco Corporation
Krim-Ko Corporation
Wham-O Manufacturing Company
Sta-Nu Corporation
Average Cost-Per-Thousand
Cost-Per-Thousand
Total Network TV TV Homes Reached
Ad Expend 1965 Dec. 1965
($000) Day ($) Night ($)
85,710 1.32 3.87
39,934 1.48 4.41
28,328 2.98
18,874 4.08
16,083 3.91
13,011 3.68
9,825 1.31 3.86
8,293 1.29 3.51
7,252 2.14 2.79
6,252 1.39 4.06
ny 6,021 8.84
5,725 4.71
5,388 1.77 2.89
4,440 1.54 5.31
3,367 5.88
3,106 4.34
2,840 1.65 2.25
2,631 2.14
2,462 1.57 3.13
2,202 3.77
2,023 2.38
1,905 4.03
1,844 1.63 3.63
1,575 1.69 3.17
1,300 1.81
1,123 2.58
1,053 1.16
815 1.03
766 1.06
615 1.13
565 3.77
on 484 4.32
396 1.74
364 1.48 4.42
145 1.92
90 2.16
81 .93
70 .93
36 1.16
20 4.00
1.A7 3.89
SOuRCES: LEADING NATIONAL ADVERTISERS AND BROADCAST ADVERTISING REPORTS, NETWORK
TELEVISION ADVERTISING REPORTS (1965); A. NIELSEN, NATIONAL NIELSEN TELEVISION INDEX,
COMPLETE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER-DECEMBER (1965).
Regressions were run with average cost-per-thousand as the dependent
variable, and total advertising expenditures as the independent variable.
Both linear and log-linear forms were used for both daytime and evening
cost estimates, making a total of four regressions. All regressions yielded
statistically insignificant coefficients of the total expenditure variable and
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very low correlation coefficients. These results indicate that average cost-per-
thousand television-homes reached does not decline with increasing total
network advertising expenditures. The data offer no support for the view
that large advertisers in network television obtain lower cost-per-thousand
rates than small advertisers.
However, because total expenditures appear on both sides of the equa.
tion, this imparts an upward bias to the coefficient of total expenditures.53
To avoid this statistical problem, the regressions were recalculated in a
different form. Gross home-commercial impressions, the sum of the products
of the number of commercial minutes each advertiser had in each of his
programs multiplied by the average minute audience reported for each
program during the month, were used as the dependent variable. As before,
the independent variable was each advertiser's total network advertising
expenditures. A coefficient greater than one for the expenditure variable
would indicate that audience increased more than proportionately with total
expenditures, and therefore, that the cost-per-thousand decreased - an ob-
vious advantage to large advertisers. Two linear regressions were run - one
using daytime and the other using evening data. Neither coefficient of the
expenditure variable was greater than one. (Similarly, when each adver-
tiser's December advertising expenditures was used as the independent
variable, the respective coefficients were, once again, less than one.) Thus
these data do not support the allegations of the FTC.
c. The Relevancy of the Cost-Per-Thousand Measure. In a footnote in
the General Foods case, the FTC recognizes the cost-per-thousand measure
but finds it to be an inappropriate measure of the efficiency of advertising:
"What respondent is in fact equating with efficiency is the popularity of a
program not originally anticipated and therefore not paid for."'' An im-
plication of this line of reasoning is that if expectations concerning audience
size had been realized, all advertisers would have had the same cost-per-
thousand homes reached - an implication which is, of course, inconsistent
with the FTC's position that the rate structure favors large advertisers. Again
the FTC apparently did not realize the inconsistency of its arguments. Even
ignoring this inconsistency, the FTC is still in error since the realized rates
are the relevant figures. They measure the productivity of the advertising
expenditures, and therefore the return earned on the advertising. Cost-per-
thousand is the price of the service provided to advertisers by the networks.
Prices of time and talent are only the costs of inputs used in producing the
service.
d. The Adequacy of the Cost-Per-Thousand Measure. Sales of an ad-
vertiser's product will be a function not only of the size of the audience
reached, but also of the composition or quality of the audience. Many
53 I am indebted to W. Allen Wallis for pointing out this statistical problem and for
suggesting the alternative formulation of the statistical test.
54 General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TWAWE REG. REP. 17,465, at
22,729 n. 11 (FTC 1966).
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viewers may not use the product, and therefore are of little value. Also,
typically a small percentage of users of a product account for a high per-
centage of total sales, and these heavy users may not be distributed uniformly
among program audiences. Another important qualitative characteristic is
the unduplicated audience- those people who have not been reached by
the firm's other advertising. A more accurate measure of the value of ad-
vertising in any medium than the audience reached would be the viewers'
purchases of the product type represented by the advertiser's brands. For
example, if the advertiser knew sales of his product were a positive function
of income and family size, he might prefer to advertise on a program that
reached higher income, larger families even if the cost-per-thousand tele-
vision-homes reached via this program were higher than that of an alter-
native program which reached greater audiences but contained fewer poten-
tial customers for his product. Refinements in the cost-per-thousand measure
to take account of differences in potential sales among program audiences
have not been made in this paper.
3. Conclusions
The cost-per-thousand television-homes reached is the relevant price of
the product sold to advertisers by the networks. These prices are not sig-
nificantly lower for large network television advertisers, and thus the data
provide no support for the FTC's allegation of discriminatory prices favor-
ing large advertisers.
MERGERS AND RATES OF RETURN
The FTC argues that diversification provides efficiencies of large size to
acquired firms. If this hypothesis is true, then the earnings of the acquired
firms, and therefore of the diversifying firms, should increase. A number of
statistical studies have measured the profitability of mergers. 55 Since there
is little need to discuss the details of these studies here, I shall simply sum-
marize their relevant findings. The findings are unanimous - merging does
not yield substantial profits for the acquiring firms. One leading study finds
that those firms which merge appear to serve managers' interests more than
stockholders' interests, because merging firms have higher growth rates but
earn lower rates of return than internal growth firms.56 Another study con-
cluded: "[T]he fact that mergers generally do not produce functional gains
means merely that mergers offer few opportunities for increased efficiency." 57
At the same time the FTC is attacking conglomerate mergers for in-
55 See, e.g., S. RmD, MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND THE ECONOMY (1968); T. Hogarty, The
Success of Industrial Mergers, June 1969 (unpublished thesis in the State University of
New York at Buffalo, Graduate School); Reid, Is the Merger the Best Way to Grow?, 12
Bus. HORIZONs 41 (1969); Segall, Merging for Fun and Profit, 9 IND. MANAGEMENT REV.
17 (1968).
These studies deal with all types of mergers, not just product-extension mergers.
56 S. REa, supra note 55, at 151-49.
57 T. Hogarty, supra note 55, at 58.
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creasing the efficiency, and hence, enhancing the dominant market positions
of acquired firms, the empirical work on the profitability of mergers is ques-
tioning the efficiency of these mergersl
CONCLUSIONS
It is unnecessary for the courts to weigh the possible improvements in
efficiency caused by product-extension mergers against possible anticom-
petitive effects because the latter do not exist. In the presence of economies
of scale in national advertising, product-extension mergers permit more firms
to exist in consumer product markets because the economies of large size are
derived from sales in several markets rather than in one market.
This paper has attempted to demonstrate major defects in the economic
arguments used by the FTC in its attack on product-extension mergers and
in its attack on advertising, and to show that the evidence presented by the
FTC fails to support its arguments. The FTC is primarily concerned about
the transformation of small business into large business and about the de-
cline in the number of firms in small-firm industries. The FTC fails to un-
derstand that in the presence of economies of scale in advertising, it cannot
prevent firms in industries such as bleach and soap pads from becoming
larger, but can only determine whether the firms become larger through
product-extension mergers without increasing market concentration or
through increasing their market shares. The FTC also fails to recognize that
allowing these mergers, rather than prohibiting them, makes possible a
larger number of efficient firms in each market, thus lowering concentration
in these markets.
Prohibiting product-extension mergers will lead to higher concentration
in individual product markets unless no economies of scale can be achieved
through such mergers. But then the FTC cannot demonstrate anticom-
petitive effects resulting from these mergers because the FTC's attack is an
attack on efficiencies of large size.
With respect to other issues raised by the FTC, there is evidence that
advertising did not eliminate price competition in these markets,58 that
advertising was beneficial to consumers, and that discriminatory discounts
were not given to large network television advertisers.
On the basis of the arguments and evidence examined in this paper, I
conclude that both product-extension mergers and advertising benefit con-
sumers.
APPENDIX
POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING
The FTC's Argument
Product-extension mergers allegedly tend to lessen price competition in these mar-
kets because of their adverse effect on potential competition. The FTC argues that the
condition of entry is an important competitive factor in oligopolistic industries be-
58 At least this is true in the bleach market. Procter & Gamble Co. [1963-1965
Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,578 (FTC 1963).
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cause the threat of new entry may cause existing oligopolists in the market to set
lower prices in order to discourage entry.
The FTC asserts that P&G was the most likely potential entrant into the household
liquid bleach market, and that its presence as a potential entrant exerted a significant
competitive influence on industry prices. The merger allegedly eliminates this significant
component of competition in an oligopolistic industry. General Foods was not considered
to be a potential entrant into the soap pad market and thus its merger with S.O.S. did
not contain the same adverse change in the competitive structure. Both mergers, however,
resulted in economies in advertising for the dominant firm in the bleach and soap pad
markets, and thus increased barriers to entry. Therefore, both Clorox and S.O.S. can
set higher prices without fear of entry.
My criticism is simply that there is no evidence in either case that potential competi-
tion had any effect on prices before the mergers. Therefore, any alleged alterations in
the state of potential competition resulting from these mergers cannot be said to have
lessened competition.
The FTC's Evidence
No determination was made whether any other soap and detergent manufacturers had
considered entry into the bleach market, or whether any other packaged food producers
had considered entry into the steel-wool soap pad industry. The FTC's "evidence" in the
Procter &' Gamble case consists of the following argument. P&G was a large, experienced
firm which produced many household cleaning products. Allegedly, it frequently had
entered new product markets by internal growth; and it had considered entering the
bleach market. "By virtue of all these facts, Procter must have figured as a tangible
influence on Clorox's policies until the merger eliminated it as a potential competitor."59
There is even less evidence of the effects of potential competition in the General Foods
case because General Foods was not considered to be a potential entrant. The FTC's
"evidence" consists of the following argument:
The record indicates that another major multiproduct company - Colgate-
Palmolive Company- was engaged in the sale of household steel wool in Canada
and thus could be regarded as a potential competitor of S. 0. S. Presumably there
were other companies engaged in the sale of low-cost, high-turnover commodities
in supermarkets, which could also be considered to have been potential entrants.
Therefore, the entry of General Foods into the market did not eliminate all poten-
tial competition. Nevertheless, its entry did have the effect of substantially lessen-
ing potential competition, since it raised to virtually insurmountable heights the
barriers to entry which had already existed to some extent....e0
If entry were not attractive to P & G, with all of its marketing advantages, how could
it be attractive to any other firm? If not, then potential competition was not a significant
competitive factor in the household bleach market. The evidence supports this argument
even more strongly in the household steel-wool soap pad market, because there is no
showing that General Foods or any other firm even considered entry via internal growth.
The available data indicate that entry on a national scale was unattractive before the
mergers occurred so that industry price in these markets was not affected by potential
competition.
59 Id. at 21,584.
60 General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465, at
22,730 (FTC 1966).
